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Copyright owners’ putative interests in privacy, reputation, and control:
A Reply to Goold

By Wendy J. Gordon*
This is a preliminary version of an essay that will appear in

103 Va. L. Rev. Online __ (2017)

Patrick Goold’s interesting new article, Unbundling the “Tort” of Copyright
Infringement 1 (“Unbundling”) centers on a key lack of clarity that Professor Goold perceives in
the cause of action for copyright infringement. The lack of clarity, he argues, afflicts threshold
definitions of what constitutes actionable copying.
Under federal copyright law, to prove infringement the plaintiff copyright owner usually
must persuade the finder-of-fact that the plaintiff owns a valid copyright and that the defendant
factually used the copyrighted work in one of the ways governed by statute. (Making use of the
copyrighted work is usually known as “actual copying” or “copying in fact”) 2 Then the plaintiff
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I thank my husband, Michael Zimmer, for his superb editorial eye; Oren Bracha for his perceptive comments; the
University of Texas School of Law at Austin for its generous hospitality while I worked on this piece; and
Alexander Piala (UT class of 2018) for his excellent research assistance. In addition, I am grateful to the wondrous
resources of BU’s Pappas Law Library, particularly the good offices of Stephanie Weigmann and Shira Megerman.
1
Patrick R. Goold, Unbundling the ‘Tort’ of Copyright Infringement, 102 VA. L. REV. 1833, 1833–34 (2016)
[hereinafter Goold, Unbundling].
2
“Copying in fact” or “actual copying” are terms of art. They address whether someone has factually

borrowed or used the copyrighted work in question. In this context, the opposite of “copying” is relying
solely on other sources or on independent creation.
1

must prove something more. 3 The copyright owner also bears what might be called a normative
burden: the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has engaged in “improper appropriation” 4 by
using the plaintiff’s copyrighted work to produce something “substantially similar” 5 to the
plaintiff’s work of authorship. 6 Later the copyright owner may also need to struggle with a
normative claim by defendant that her use of the plaintiff’s expression, even if “substantial,”
should be permitted as “fair”. 7

(In this broad sense of “copying”, to read a copyrighted book chapter over the radio is to “copy” it. In
some other contexts, however, to “copy” may literally mean “to reproduce”.)
Although to “copy” (in the context of the plaintiff’s case in chief) means essentially “to use”, not all
unauthorized uses of copyrighted work are unlawful. For example, the Copyright Act gives everyone the
liberty to copy ideas. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). For another example, while the Act gives copyright owners
some rights over public performance, 17 U.S.C. § 106(4), the Act does not reach private performance, id.
Thus reading a copyrighted book aloud in one’s living room cannot violate the performance right. Id.;
also see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of “publicly”).
3
VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 2016) (“proof of actual copying is
insufficient to establish copyright infringement”).
4

For courts using this terminology, see, e.g., Muller v. Anderson, 501 F. App’x. 81, 83 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[T]he
plaintiff must prove . . . improper appropriation.”); Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1986)
(quoting Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 979, 977 (2d. Cir.)) (“Walker must show . . . that his
expression was ‘improperly appropriated’ . . . .”); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (noting the
plaintiff must show that “the copying . . . went so far as to constitute improper appropriation”).
5
For courts employing this terminology, see, e.g., Almeda Mall, L.P. v. Shoe Show, Inc., 649 F.3d 389, 391 (5th
Cir. 2011) (concluding that “the trade name SHOE SHOW is not substantially similar to THE SHOE DEPT. . . . .”);
Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Copying may be established by showing that
the infringer had access to plaintiff’s copyrighted work and that the works at issue are substantially similar in their
protected elements.”); Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 1983) (“The basic issues
concerning the copyright infringement claim are whether the Hero and Superman works are substantially similar so
as to support an inference of copying . . . .”).
6
Infringement can occur through producing an unauthorized physical reproduction, see 117 U.S.C. § 106(1), an
unauthorized derivative work, see 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), or an unauthorized public performance, see sections 106(4)
and 106(6). In addition, a defendant can infringe by distributing or publicly displaying an unlawfully made copy or
even, under some circumstances, by distributing or publicly displaying a lawfully made copy the defendant does not
own. See 17 U.S.C. § section 106(3) (distribution right) as modified by 17 U.S.C. §§ 109(a) (first sale doctrine); 17
U.S.C. § 106(5) (public display right) as modified by 17 U.S.C. § 109(c). Additional causes of action exist under
the statute, but they are best seen as para-copyright and distinct from copyright infringement per se. See, e.g., 17
U.S.C. §§ 1201–04 (civil and criminal penalties applicable to, inter alia, unauthorized circumvention of physical
copy-restraints such as encryption.)
7

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (“the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright.”)
For a common-law flavored introduction to the complex “fair use” doctrine, see Wendy J. Gordon,
Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use: Transaction Costs Have Always Been Only Part of the
Story, 50 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 149 (2003).
2

As Goold notes, 8 courts do not reliably define the normative part of the plaintiff’s cause
of action in the same way. The terms “substantially similar” or “improper appropriation” receive
somewhat varying interpretations. A related difficulty that Goold identifies typically arises on
the defense side: he perceives inconsistency in how courts distinguish “fair” from “unfair” uses. 9
In Unbundling, Goold suggests that more clarity would result if the judiciary would follow his
recommendations and identify, within copyright infringement, several individual, if currently
inchoate, tort causes of action. 10
Goold in previous work has made good use of tort doctrine to explore copyright law, 11
and his new project has intriguing possibilities. Today’s federal copyright statute runs for many
pages that are often dense with complex language, yet its details nevertheless fail to resolve
many cases. Sometimes fraying or uncertainty in core concepts is responsible for this failure.
Similarly hoping to increase clarity, Pamela Samuelson is unpacking many of the ways that

8

Goold, Unbundling, supra note 1, at 1836–37.
Id. Fair use doctrine is a vehicle for evaluating whether a substantial borrowing might, in the particular context of
a particular fact pattern, nevertheless be normatively entitled to go forward without permission and payment. The
fair use doctrine can render even exact copies non-infringing. 17 U.S.C. §107 (listing “multiple copies for classroom
use” as a possible focus for fair use); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449–51
(1984) (home videotaping of entire TV programs can be fair use when done for purposes of time-shifting).
9

Goold is quite right that ordinarily “fair use” arises in a defendant's case, and that the defendant will usually bear
some or all of the burden of persuasion. Goold, Unbundling, supra note 1, at 1836. However, the statute itself does
not identify “fair use” as an affirmative defense. Rather, the Copyright Act’s key provision on fair use, 17 U.S.C. §
107 (2012), says only that fair uses are “not an infringement of copyright,” a phrase that could be legitimately
interpreted to place a burden of proving unfair use on plaintiffs as part of their case in chief. In some cases, some
portion of a burden to prove unfair use has indeed been placed on plaintiffs, whether implicitly or explicitly.
The right to make fair uses of others’ work is an important part of the public’s liberties to use others’ copyrighted
expression. This set of liberties is sometimes identified with “users’ rights”. See CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc'y
of Upper Can., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, 364 (Can.) (“User rights are not just loopholes”, quoting with approval DAVID
VAVER, COPYRIGHT LAW (2000) at 171).
10
Goold, Unbundling, supra note 1, at 1838, 1898.
11
See, Oren Bracha & Patrick R. Goold, Copyright Accidents, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1025, 1027–1029 (2016) (. This
article explores how copyright law should treat defendants who, after a good-faith but fruitless attempt to locate and
pay any copyright holders, take the risk of publishing, and then learn they have copied a substantial amount of
copyrighted material. One might say such defendants have “accidentally” copied a copyrighted work, a metaphor
that Bracha and Goold take seriously and deploy to good effect.

3

courts employ copyright’s “merger” doctrine. 12 She, along with other scholars, has begun
unbundling and identifying several distinct defenses hiding behind the label “fair use.” 13 Given
copyright’s many unsolved puzzles, determining whether the ‘substantial similarity’ or
‘improper appropriation’ aspect of infringement can be unbundled is a route that certainly has
promise.
Unbundling argues that copyright infringement appears to be a unitary tort but that it
actually contains within itself five unarticulated sub-torts. Goold suggests that if in fact we could
unpack copyright into its component concerns, a “gallery of wrongs” 14 of the type other torts
possess, there might well be a distinct infringement test for each type of infringement. 15 Thus, he
argues that discerning the different sub-torts within the copyright-infringement bundle could help

12

Pamela Samuelson, Reconceptualizing Copyright's Merger Doctrine, 63 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 417, 417–19
(2016).
13
See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2539–41 (2009) (arguing that
the success of fair use defense falls into common patterns); Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure
Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 7–8, 16–18 (1997)
(recognizing fair use rights as expansive and exploring how fair use doctrine impacted rights given to the copyright
owner and user over time) ; Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of
the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1627–35 (1982) (exploring fair use as a response
to, inter alia, high transaction costs, external benefits, noncommercial uses, nonmonetizable values, and antidissemination motives).
14
Goold argues that copyright infringement is oddly “singular,” as opposed to the multiple causes of action that
characterize other areas of tort, Goold, Unbundling, supra note 1, at 1838-39, and he contends that copyright lacks
the explicit “gallery of wrongs” structure found in many other areas of tort. Id. at 1855-56. These claims are
puzzling.
First, much of the activity denominated copyright infringement is socially useful and not morally wrongful
in itself; the ‘wrong’ lies in disobeying the law which requires the activity to purchase a license. To label every
breach of law a ‘wrong’ is technically a correct usage, but the usage nevertheless dilutes the force of the word.
Second, copyright has a full (one might say over-full) gallery of distinct breaches, full of detailed
differences. The Copyright Act sets out many subcategories of copyright infringement that it explicitly
distinguishes, both in terms of types of works protected, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), and in terms of the typology of rights
that attach to owning a particular kind of work, 17 U.S.C. §§ 106 and 106A. The Act then makes each type of work
and type of right subject to particularized exemptions and defenses. 17 U.S.C. §§ 108–122. A good illustration of
the lines the statute draws can be seen by comparing the acts that can infringe copyright in a “sound recording” with
the acts that can infringe copyright in a “musical work.” 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 106, 114 (2012). The copyright statute
thus certainly seems to display a ‘gallery’ of causes of action.
Nevertheless, the importance of Goold’s point depends neither on whether copyright infringement is a
“wrong” in a meaningful sense, nor on the question of whether copyright infringement is unitary or internally
diverse. All Goold needs to show is that making some additional distinctions among types of breach would be
useful. That question his article skillfully raises.
15
Goold, Unbundling, supra note 1, at 1838–39.

4

judges choose, and lawyers anticipate, the appropriate test for identifying infringing uses. This is
an advance, so far as I know, over prior applications of the unbundling method in copyright
scholarship.
He suggests that the standard copyright owner interest in revenue be divided into two
sub-torts: protection from unauthorized consumer copying and protection from competitors
diverting one’s potential customers. In addition, Goold suggests, that within copyright lie three
additional causes of action geared to protect copyright owners’ interests in privacy, in reputation,
and in controlling ‘rivalrous’ 16 uses. 17
The five sub-torts that Goold offers are: (1) consumer copying, which he identifies as the
primary ‘wrong’ with which copyright law is concerned, 18 followed by (2) diversion of
customers by competitors, 19 (3) invasion of expressive privacy, 20 (4) injury to artistic
reputation, 21 and (5) breach of creative control (by which he means interference with a rivalrous
use). 22 For mainstream interpretations of copyright, Goold’s first two initial categories—
customer copying and competitor/publisher diversion—are the standard concerns that copyright
courts address. The other three are more controversial than the article indicates.

16

Intangible patterns like works of authorship are usually considered non-rivalrous because, as Goold explains, “one
person’s use does not affect the use of another.” Goold, Unbundling, supra note 1, at 1831. Despite the possibility
of infinitely replicating a book or song, physical inexhaustibility does not guarantee that one person’s use will not
affect another person’s profit. Goold essentially tries to identify occasions on which the rivalrous aspect
predominates. For further discussion of what might constitute a ‘rivalrous use’, and of the category’s ambiguities,
see infra at _ {section on the ‘right of creative control’} _.
17
I am glad Goold did not propose a sub-tort to vindicate publisher as distinct from authorship interests. In my view,
publishers’ claims under copyright should be related to the publishers’ role in incentivizing creative expression, and
no deference should be paid in copyright cases to supporting publishers’ non-creative activities. Wendy J. Gordon,
Authors, Publishers and Public Goods: Trading Gold for Dross, 36 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 159-97 (2002) (arguing
that in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003), the Supreme erred when it hinted that noncreative publisher activity
constituted an interest capable of helping to justify federal copyright.)
18
Id. at 1857.
19
See id. at 1860.
20
See id. at 1865.
21
See id. at 1867.
22
See id. at 1869.

5

Of those three, a right to control rivalrous uses probably has the strongest claim to being
based in the caselaw. Unfortunately, that right has probably-inescapable definitional weaknesses
that make it dangerously susceptible to expansion. The sub-tort to redress reputation injury
flowing from misattribution of authorship has some intriguing possibilities, though its feasibility
is also questionable (though for different reasons). As for the invasion of privacy sub-tort, it goes
strongly against the grain of some recent copyright cases.
My own view is that Goold overstates the explanatory role of tort law. 23 But even were
that not the case, the courts need to reach some kind of ‘settled’ understanding on these various
interests before a cause of action is created or definitively rejected, and that no such consensus
on the three matters mentioned yet exists, whether they are viewed as forms of ‘tort’ or
otherwise. Goold’s work may nevertheless be an important step toward reaching closure on
these and other open questions in copyright law.
Let us take the five categories of Goold’s sub-torts in order.
Consumer Copying.
Copyright’s familiar concerns lie with commercially significant copying by competitors
and consumers. It is this commercial recompense that an author hopes for, and that serves as

23

Copyright reflects the influence of a number of common-law doctrines to which Goold gives
little or no serious attention. For example, unjust-enrichment law (also known as ‘restitution’)
gives recovery occasionally to volunteers who confer benefits without contract. Such cases
provide significant insight into when and why the common law might be unwilling to require
beneficiaries to pay for benefits others create. Yet Goold dismisses the relevance of restitution
law, largely on the ground that giving it analogic significance “would potentially justify
[copyright] owners claiming reward every time the work is enjoyed,” id. at 1854. Goold’s
position is deeply puzzling, given that unjust enrichment law gives recovery far more sparingly
than does tort law. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and
Intellectual Property, 41 JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 449 (1992). Goold cites some of my work
on this topic, id. at n. 150, but fails to explain adequately why he disagrees about the influence
restitution law would have.
6

incentive for production. Goold takes an unconventional approach, though, dividing consumer
from competitor copying.
Goold’s first major innovation is to put consumer copying as the copyright’s central tortwithin-a-tort, and to designate publisher diversion of consumers as a secondary concern of
copyright law. This elevation of consumers as copiers is profoundly ahistorical. The United
States borrowed its initial copyright scheme largely from the English Statute of Anne, which in
turn evolved out of battles among publishers. 24 In the United States, the first federal Copyright
Act prohibited only the unauthorized “printing, reprinting, publishing and vending” of the
copyrighted work. 25 As a physical matter in 1790, consumers could neither print nor reprint.
Consumers might copy longhand, but that was unlikely to be commercially significant.
Copyright’s focus on publisher behavior persisted well into the 20th century, even after
the start of modern home copying technology. For example, when in 1972 sound recordings were
made federally copyrightable, Congress went out of its way to explain that home copyists could
continue to safely use their tape recorders to make permanent copies of their favorite songs
because (says the legislative history) copyright law only addressed commercial copying. 26 At
least in 1972, Congress seemed to envisage no possible liability for private behavior, whether the
private behavior was copying a work or performing or adapting it. 27 Only when the home
product was physically replicated and sold commercially would copyright law take action.
Goold’s paper addresses a world greatly changed since 1972. The progress of home
reprographic and distribution technology, in the form of computers, tape recorders, video

24

See OREN BRACHA, OWNING IDEAS: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 17901909, 36–42 & 58 (2016).
25
Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
26
117 Cong. Rec. 34,748–49 (1971) (“Mr. KAZEN: Am I correct in assuming that the bill protects copyrighted
material that is duplicated for commercial purposes only? Mr. KASTENMEIER: Yes.”)
27
Jessica Litman, Campbell at 21/Sony at 31, 90 WASH. L. REV. 651, 662 (2015).

7

recorders, internet linkages, and the rest, has been so rapid as to make a profound difference in
consumer abilities to create, obtain, and transmit copyrighted material.
Goold implies the law has also greatly changed. Indeed, Congress has paid increasing
attention to consumer copying and transmission. One example is copyright’s criminal provisions.
In 1978, private copying for noncommercial purposes was essentially free from criminal
sanction. 28 In recent years, however, amendments to the criminal law provisions have largely
eliminated noncommerciality as a safe haven. 29 Another change lies in Congress not only
permitting copyright owners to physically encrypt their digital work, but also backing up the
encryption with federal penalties for bypass. 30
Yet Goold overstates by placing consumer copying at the center of 2017 copyright law.
Congress made its last major overhaul of federal copyright law in 1976, and the vast majority of
the 1976 provisions remain intact. Admittedly, there have been several high-profile suits against
peer-to-peer networks and their consumer users, and the district courts have seen a flood of
“idiosyncratic” suits 31 seeking to milk disproportionate statutory damages from downloaders. 32

28

As initially enacted in 1976, section 506 provided, in pertinent part, that criminal penalties applied to someone
who “infringes a copyright willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain.” An Act
for the General Revision of the Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 506, 90 Stat. 2586 (1976).
29
First, the original term, “private financial gain,” has recently been redefined to expand the reach of the criminal
provisions. Today, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) states, “The term ‘financial gain’ includes receipt, or expectation of
receipt, of anything of value, including the receipt of other copyrighted works.”
Second, criminal liability under the copyright statute has been expanded to include, inter alia, behavior such as
bypassing encryption. See 17 U.S.C. § 1204 (2012). Third, section 506 itself covers additional activity that
consumers might well engage in, including “the reproduction or distribution, including by electronic means, during
any 180–day period, of 1 or more copies or phonorecords of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total retail
value of more than $1,000.” 17 U.S.C § 506(a)(1)(B) (2012).
30
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 1204 (2012) (creating criminal penalties for violation).
31
Matthew Sag, IP Litigation in U.S. District Courts: 1994 to 2014, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1065, 1077 (2016).
32
Id. at 1075–80. The primary goal of these suits is “creating an independent litigation revenue stream that is
unrelated to compensation for the harms of infringement and that is unconcerned with deterrence.” Id. at 1075–76.
There also had been a wave of suits against end-users “to ‘educate’ the public about filesharing and to reinforce that
education with deterrence.” Id. at 1075–76. Those suits essentially ended in 2008. Id. at 1075.

8

But the latter suits, though numerous, are not a reliable focus for assessing copyright policy. 33
Putting them aside, the vast majority of copyright litigation addresses copying and adaptation by
commercial companies and re-publishers, not copying by consumers.
Goold’s shift of focus to consumer copying might be justified given the drastic increase
in potential commercial significance that consumer behaviors now have. However, Goold offers
no sustained argument to that effect, 34 and no convincing evidence that consumer copying
constitutes a more significant infringement than commercial copying does. If we are to ignore a
doctrine’s historical roots, we expect some exploration of the costs and benefits of doing so.
It is hard to see what Goold gains by prioritizing consumer copying. It helps him provide
answers to some questions, but largely exchanges one set of puzzles for another. For example,
consider the question of whether and under what conditions a consumer’s failure to pay a license
fee should weigh against the consumer’s claim to “fair use” treatment. 35 As set forth in
Unbundling, this new sub-tort requires, among other things, “[a]pplying the basic incentiveaccess policy calculus,” under which a court decides whether “specific uses [are] of the type
where wealth redistribution [is] necessary to ensure optimal incentives.” 36
Competitor diversion of customers
For most of the copyright bar, Goold’s second proposed category—publisher diversion of
customers—is the core of copyright law. So identifying this category is useful primarily in the
context of a panoply of other meaningful choices, and I will forego lengthy discussion of it here.

33

Id. at 1077 (“policymakers should be cautious about extrapolating from current trends in this context”). In my
view, Congress and the courts are more likely to pull back these suits, which essentially abuse the system, than to
treat them as a model.
34
Goold, Unbundling, supra note 1 at 1857–59.
35
See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, The Concept of “Harm” in Copyright, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
COMMON LAW 452, 477–80 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013) (discussing whether failure to pay license fees
constitutes a harm under various theories); Loren, supra note 10, at 6 (discussing rejection of fair use claims where
the copyright owners established licensing systems).
36
Goold, Unbundling, supra note 1, at 1858. Also, see id. passim.

9

Nevertheless, one correction is needed. In explaining ‘customer diversion by
competitors,’ Goold gives an example of two lighthouses that take each other’s customers. 37 The
example might easily be misunderstood to suggest that copyright makes actionable any kind of
commercial harm that involves competitors selling similar products or services, regardless of the
presence or absence of borrowing. Goold should be wary of using an example that may lead
readers to overlook the particular kind of causation that is essential to copyright.
A copyright plaintiff must prove that a defendant has somehow used the plaintiff’s work
in a way that made a difference to the defendant: 38 unless free riding on the plaintiff’s work was
a “but-for cause” of what the defendant produced or did, no liability arises. In other words, this is
a requirement that the defendant’s product borrow something from the plaintiff’s work.
This two-lighthouse example might be appropriate were Goold writing about patent law,
which does empower suit against independent inventors who happen to provide a product
identical to what is patented. By contrast, to make Goold’s example fit copyright law, one

37

Goold, Unbundling, supra note 1, at 1860. Aside from the problem of identifying “customers” who would pay for
a non-excludable good such as a shining light, the hypothetical does not involve any copying, borrowing, freeriding, or other use of the first lighthouse’s resources by the newcomer lighthouse. This cannot be a copyright
example, then, for copyright suits cannot proceed without proof that the defendant has gained something from the
plaintiff’s work. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Copyright and Negligence as Mirror Models: On Not Mistaking for the
Right Hand What the Left Hand is Doing, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND Economics 311, 323–25 (Theodore Eisenberg
& Giovanni B. Ramello eds., 2016) (discussing “copying” element in cause of action as requiring evidence that
defendant gained output, defined broadly as appearance, quantity and cost of production, after coming into contact
with plaintiffs work). Goold places little emphasis on the example; he is simply doing a rhetorical turn on a classic
public-goods illustration. But just a sentence or two before the example, he commits real error, in stating that the
reason why copyright law allows suit against publishers has nothing to do with a desire to allow authors to
“internalize” some of the benefits their efforts give others. Goold reserves that concern with internalizing only for
consumer copying. Goold, Unbundling, supra note 1, at 1859–60.
38
See, Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 53 (2d Cir. 1936) (“[I]t makes no difference how far
the play was anticipated by works in the public demesne [public domain] which the plaintiffs did not use”). In a
now-classic formulation, the Second Circuit emphasized that the key factual question in copyright is “whether the
defendants actually used” the copyrighted work. Id. at 53. The court notes that:
… [I]f by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats's Ode on a
Grecian Urn, he would be an “author,” and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem,
though they might of course copy Keats's. ... [J]ust as he is no less an ‘author’ because others have
preceded him, so another who follows him, is not a tort-feasor unless he pirates his work…..
Sheldon, at 54 (sources omitted; emphasis added). A plaintiff cannot complain of copying by the
defendant, so long as the copying is not from the plaintiff’s work. Id. at 54.

10

lighthouse would have to be taking advantage of the other’s efforts or resources in some way.
But in Goold’s actual example, one lighthouse makes no use of anything owned by or produced
by the other. In his example as constituted, the only causal link is one of harm. Harm is neither
necessary nor sufficient to meet copyright’s causal link. What satisfies copyright’s “copying”
element is not harm done to a plaintiff’s market, but rather some benefit the defendant has reaped
that is causally due to his or her use of the plaintiff’s work. There is no free riding between the
two lighthouses. And while proof of free riding is far from sufficient to prove copyright
infringement, it remains an essential component of the prima-facie case.
Redress of privacy invasions.
After consumer and competitor copying, Goold attributes to copyright a sub-tort that
provides protection against privacy invasions. 39 Using federal copyright as a protector of
copyright owners’ privacy is particularly problematic.
Although some caselaw provides a bit of support for such a position, a myriad of cases
reject privacy and other dignitary roles for federal copyright. Of particular relevance is the
conclusion by the Ninth Circuit, writing en banc, that “the protection of privacy is not a function
of the copyright law.” 40 It is possible such cases are wrong as a normative matter, but Goold
seeks to provide a descriptive account of copyright law. 41

39

Goold, Unbundling, supra note 1 at 1865.
Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 745 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (quoting Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 395
(4th Cir. 2003)). This statement about privacy is arguably dicta, but was nevertheless a matter to which the opinion
gave serious consideration. The en banc court continues:
‘To the contrary, the copyright law offers a limited monopoly to encourage ultimate public access
to the creative work of the author.’ Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 395 (4th Cir. 2003); see also
Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1177 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bond and
‘pointedly’ noting copyright cases are analyzed ‘only under copyright principles, not privacy law’)
Likewise, authors cannot seek emotional distress damages under the Copyright Act, because such
damages are unrelated to the value and marketability of their works.
Garcia, 786 F.3d at 745.
41
Goold, Unbundling, supra note 1, at 1898–99.
40

11

Until the 1976 Copyright Act became effective in 1978, private and otherwise
unpublished manuscripts were largely handled by state rather than federal copyright. Only a few
categories of unpublished material were even eligible for federal registration. Certainly, in 1978,
federal copyright law expanded to embrace all unpublished works, so long as they were written
down, tape-recorded, or otherwise “fixed.” 42 But this expansion of federal reach did not change
federal policy.
The key document, the House Report for the 1976 Copyright Act, gives a number of
reasons for bringing unpublished works into federal copyright, having primarily to do with
simplicity, administrability, and uniformity. 43 Nowhere is there a hint that federal copyright was
meant to adopt any privacy or dignity concerns that states may have injected into their commonlaw or statutory protections for local authors. 44 Further, when post-1978 courts began giving too
much deference to the desires of copyright owners to control quotations from unpublished
manuscripts, Congress responded by dialing-down the deference such copyright owners
received; the statute was amended to ensure that biographers and other members of the public
could make “fair use” of unpublished works when otherwise appropriate.

45

Conceivably Goold can make privacy hay out of our country’s accession to the Berne
Convention, which caused changes in federal copyright law 46 that arguably introduced personal
and emotional concerns into certain subparts of federal law. 47 However, the Berne changes are in

42

See 17 U.S.C § 301 (2012) (pre-empting state copyright law); id. § 102 (conditions for federal copyright).
See, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 129–31 (1976).
44
Id.
45
In 1992, the fair use provision was amended to decrease the negative impact of a work’s being unpublished; the
statute now states, “The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is
made upon consideration of all the above factors.” 17 U.S.C § 107.
46
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 & 106A. These sections comprise the key provisions of the Visual Artists Rights Act
of 1990, Pub. L. 101–650, title VI, § 603 (a), Dec. 1, 1990, 104 Stat. 5128, which was part of the US effort to
implement its earlier accession to the Berne Convention.
47
But see, 17 U.S.C § 104(c) (2012) (providing that rights “shall not be expanded or reduced by virtue of, or in
reliance upon, the provisions of the Berne Convention, or the adherence of the United States thereto”) (emphasis
43
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tension with America’s iconoclastic free speech tradition, so trying to make them the foundation
for a privacy cause of action within copyright will be (or at least should be) an uphill battle.
Goold is right that some federal copyright cases hint that privacy is a legitimate copyright
concern. But doctrinal development, demands of internal consistency, and copyright policy lean
predominantly the other way. For example, consider the difficulty of inserting privacy concerns
into copyright law in light of the historic distinction between ownable expression and
unprotectable ideas and facts. 48 The Supreme Court has indicated that this freedom to copy facts
may be essential to copyright’s constitutionality. 49 Therefore, no copyright cause of action would
lie for uncomfortable facts gleaned from even the most private diary.
In addition, a host of differences between copyright law and privacy rights would make it
difficult to know how to shape a privacy claim in copyright law. Common-law privacy rights are
personal, so that, for example, they usually expire upon death, 50 whereas copyright not only
survives an author’s death, but can be owned by someone other than the creator.
Artistic reputational injury occasioned by misattribution of altered work
This misattribution sub-tort has difficulties, but also has promise. Before discussing it,
some background will be helpful to appreciate the appropriately narrow ground upon which
Goold puts his focus.
Non-lawyers sometimes equate copyright with plagiarism, ignoring the many differences
between them. One of the distinctions between the two lies in the roles played by attribution.

added). Subsection (c) was added to Section 104 by § 4(a)(3) of the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988,
Pub. L. 100–568, effective March 1, 1989.
48
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 356 (1991)
(“Section 102(b) is universally understood to prohibit any copyright in facts.”)
49
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-221 (2003).
50
See, e.g., Hendrickson v. Cal. Newspapers, Inc., 48 Cal.App.3d 59, 62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (“It is well settled that
the right of privacy is purely a personal one. . . the right does not survive but dies with the person”).
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Plagiarism results from inaccurate attribution of authorship, usually by someone seeking
an improper boost for his or her reputation (or grade) by making unacknowledged use of others’
language. Lack of attribution is the core of the wrong in plagiarism, and proper attribution is its
cure.
In copyright, attribution pushes in the opposite direction. Proper attribution tends to make
copyright infringements more harmful rather than less, because identifying the true author of
what an infringer is selling is likely simply to increases the infringer’s profit.
Say, for example, that someone without authorization mass-produces and sells a bestselling Stephen King novel. Sales of the infringing version without King’s name would be lower
than the volume of sales that would result if the infringer accurately put King’s name on the
cover. Similarly, consider someone who without authorization translates King’s novel into
Spanish, making an infringing derivative work. 51 Should the translator name herself as sole
author of the Spanish-language novel, sales are likely to be modest, while sales would increase if
she labelled the book a translation of a novel “by Stephen King”.
Goold does not fall into the trap of equating copyright with plagiarism. Goold’s article
instead plays a valuable role by focusing on one narrow kind of reputational injury: that which
flows from producing a degraded or distorted version of the plaintiff’s work and attributing it to
plaintiff. An example might be if the translator just mentioned made drastic changes to Stephen
King’s plot or dialogue; if she attributed the quite different work to King, his reputation as a
skillful writer might suffer. The argument in Unbundling would suggest that the harm thereby
done to King’s reputation would (if King owned the copyright) play a proper role in any suit
King might bring against the distorted translation.

51

The affected rights appear in 17 USC § 106(1) (reproduction); § 106 (2) (preparing derivative works); and § 106
(3) (distribution to the public). 17 USC § 106 (2012).
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It is good that Goold cabins his reputational sub-tort to these instances where the
defendant attributes poorly executed unauthorized versions to the copyright owner. But even as
to that fact pattern, the article leaves many issues unaddressed. Perhaps most obvious is the
danger that reputation inquiry will collapse into inquiries into whether the second work is of
lesser quality than the copied work. Issues of judicial competency and of free speech would
attend any attempt by judges to decide what counts as a ‘worthy’ or ‘unworthy’ adaptation of a
work of art. 52
Admittedly, joining the Berne Convention required the US to adopt the so-called “moral
rights” of attribution and integrity, 53 which involve reputation. But Congress has been leery of
importing such inquiries into American law, dragging its feet on ‘moral rights’ for some time,
and then adopting legislation, the Artists Visual Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”), 54 which is quite
narrow.
Among other limits, VARA does not give so-called rights of attribution or integrity to
literary works, movies, music, or “any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram,
model, applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, book, magazine, newspaper.” 55 In
this and other ways, Congress cabined the reputation/integrity rights of VARA within limits so
strongly fenced as to make the rights almost useless. 56 This narrowness should not surprise us.
Fair use and the first amendment are about searching for truth, not securing reputations against

52

The canonical caution to judges on this topic belongs to Justice Holmes: “It would be a dangerous undertaking for
persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of
the narrowest and most obvious limits.” Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903),
53
Berne Convention, § 18.01 note 2, art. 6bis, ¶(1), available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=283698#P123_20726
54
17 U.S.C. §§101 & 106A (The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub.L. 101–650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5123–33)..
55

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (definition of “work of visual art”, part A(i) of the provision defining what “A work of
visual art does not include”).
56
See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012). Also see the remarkably narrow definition of the type of work covered by the
attribution and integrity right, at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (definition of “work of visual art”).
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attack. In fact, in a major copyright opinion, the Supreme Court held that the very human desire
to avoid being ridiculed is a reason that favors giving parodists and other critics a somewhat free
rein to quote and distort the copyrighted oeuvres they ridicule. 57
Copyright law may not be the proper venue for reputational inquiry. VARA is
incorporated within the copyright statute, but the statute distinguishes ownership of ‘integrity
and moral rights’ from ownership of copyright. 58 Moreover, as Judge Frank Easterbrook has
argued, the narrowness of VARA suggests Congress does not want broad moral rights inserted
into copyright law generally. 59 Explicit limits should not be casually contravened by inserting a
reputation right into the general infringement action “through the back door.” 60
In addition, the feasibility of embracing Goold’s reputational sub-tort needs greater
attention. One practical problem arises in regard to the different kinds of reputational harm that
can arise. There is a thin line between using copyright to discourage misattribution of altered
work (a use of copyright law which Goold seems to approve), and using copyright law to

57

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994).
17 U.S.C. § 106A(b) & §106A(e)(2). VARA rights cannot be transferred, and waivers must be in writing. Id.
When the creator of a work of visual art assigns copyright to a purchaser, therefore, the transfer neither gives the
new copyright owner any of the creator’s VARA rights nor automatically waives those rights. To shelter a purchaser
from undue burdens in maintaining the “integrity” of a work of visual art, Congress provided some exceptions. See,
e.g., 17 U.S.C. §106A (c)(2) (“The modification of a work of visual art which is the result of conservation, or of the
public presentation, including lighting and placement, of the work is not a destruction, distortion, mutilation, or
other modification …”)
59
Lee v. A.R.T. Company, 125 F.3d 580, 582-583 (7th Cir. 1997) Judge Easterbrook writes: “It would not be sound
to use § 106(2) [the exclusive right over derivative works] to provide artists with exclusive rights deliberately
omitted from the Visual Artists Rights Act.” In my view it would be just as unsound to use any of the other § 106
rights, such as the exclusive right over reproduction in §106(1) or the exclusive right over public performance in
§106 (4), to provide creators with those deliberately-omitted rights.
60
Id. at 582 (Criticizing a broad theory “about what counts as a derivative work” under§ 106(2) because adopting
that theory would erroneously imply that “the United States has established through the back door an extraordinarily
broad version of authors’ moral rights, under which artists may block any modification of their works of which they
disapprove.”)
58
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discourage ridicule per se (which Goold agrees is outside copyright’s proper role.) 61 It would be
helpful if Goold addressed how to handle these close cousins.
Reading between the lines of Unbundling, the distinction between non-actionable and
actionable reputational injury seems to lie in whether the audience knows who is authoring the
distortions. When an audience encounters a parody of a well-known work, arguably it knows the
copied work in sufficient detail to be able to attribute the absurd twists to the parodists. If any
injury arises from loss of reputation in such a case, the loss occurs not because the audience
attributes the parody (which might be clunky or silly or obscene) to the authors of the parodied
work, but rather because the parody provided an insight that made the audience re-evaluate the
copyrighted work (which ex hypothesis the audience continues to remember quite accurately) in
a negative way. 62
By contrast, the reputational injury that concerns Goold arises when the audience is
misinformed about what the copyright owner produced. His prime example is Gilliam v. ABC,
where the television audience saw a set of dismally unfunny comedic skits under the Monty
Python label, not knowing that the works’ artistic failure was due not to the Monty Python troupe
as author, but to a TV network having made many unauthorized and unfortunate cuts and
changes. 63
Such distinctions between avenues of reputational harm makes sense as a conceptual
matter. As a practical matter, however, the distinction rests on remarkably hard-to-prove facts.
For example, some people in an audience will erroneously attribute a parodist’s twists to the

61

Referring to Campbell v. Acuff Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994), Goold accurately states that a copyright owner’s
interest in being “free from ridicule” has “no protection under federal copyright.” Goold, Unbundling, supra note 1
at 1872-73 & n. 282.
62
When demand decreases because consumer tastes change, it is appropriate that the incentive ‘signal’ should also
reduce.
63
This is roughly the pattern of Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976), which Goold
discusses in Unbundling at 1868-69.
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copied author while others in the audience will not make the mistake; how should such questions
be handled? One might ask whether introducing such a complex matter of proof into copyright
is worth the candle.
Attribution of authorship raises additional feasibility issues. Thus, for example,
identifying “serious practical problems,” 64 the U.S. Supreme Court barred issues of authorial
attribution from being litigated under the Lanham Act, which is the repository of federal
trademark law. 65 One of the Court’s primary concerns was that a legal requirement of accurate
attribution might require litigants and judges to engage in a fruitless “search for the source of the
Nile and all its tributaries.” 66 The Court took the issue authorial source off the Lanham Act
agenda despite plausible support for attribution questions in the language of the applicable
statute and despite the fact that giving consumers accurate information about source is a crucial
concern of trademark law.
I do not mean to take this precedent too far. The Supreme Court’s trademark opinion
does not compel the exclusion of attribution issues from copyright law. In fact, the trademark
dispute had focused on the labeling of a work in the public domain, and the Court opined that
public-domain works were likely to present more difficult authorship issues than works whose
copyrights are still valid. 67 Nevertheless, given the accretive nature of culture, identifying the
authors of works still in valid copyright can be also be immensely difficult. Consider a child’s
copyrighted stuffed toy, based on a copyrighted animated movie, which was based on a

64

Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp, 539 U.S. 23, 35 (2003).
Id. at 36–7 (refusing to allow plaintiffs to use the Lanham Act to try questions regarding proper attribution of
authorship).
66
Id. at 36.
67
Id. at 35. (“Without a copyrighted work as the basepoint, the word ‘origin’ has no discernable limits.”) Yet
difficulties in determining authorial origin can arise regardless of a work’s legal status; even copyrighted works
often contain multiple sources. Also, Dastar has been generally applied to bar trademark claims of false authorial
attribution in cases involving copyrighted works as well as those involving public-domain works.
65
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copyrighted story in English, which in turn was based on a copyrighted Russian-language
version of a Ukrainian folk tale. “The Nile and its tributaries,” indeed.
Conceivably there are ways to make copyright litigation of reputation/attribution issues
somewhat feasible for literary works and other works not eligible for VARA (though VARA’s
own limits raise normative and positive doubts about doing so). For example, detailed rules
might ameliorate some line-drawing problems, such as how to distinguish between authorial and
non-authorial contributions to a work. 68 And Goold is correct that some copyright cases hint that
courts will be particularly unsympathetic to defendants who not only make unauthorized changes
to a work but also name the horrified copyright owner as its author. All told, if the feasibility
issues can be resolved, courts might well be more willing to find ‘improper appropriation’, and
to deny ‘fair use’, if a plaintiff can show reputational harm flowing from the defendant’s having
put the copied author’s name on a significantly altered version of the work.
The right of creative control
This last sub-tort on Goold’s list, involving ‘creative control,’ has more promise than its
name suggests. At first the reader thinks that ‘creative control’ constitutes kind of a “residual
category” 69 or catch-all -- something that copyright owners might assert against any
unauthorized use that neither causes harm nor interferes with any commercial plan or activity of
the copyright owner. 70 Goold’s reliance on David Ladd’s well-known and controversial piece,

68

For example, Congress or the courts might spell out how much ‘new matter’ must be added before a claim of
attribution is warranted, for example, or how to treat a copyright owner’s claim that involves misattribution when
the actual creator is not the person who owns the copyright. However, Goold’s advice against formal recognition of
the sub-torts could make it difficult to specify such rules. Goold, Unbundling, supra note 1, at 1895-98
(recommending against statutory implementation).
69
Goold refers to the right of creative control as a “residual category”, Goold, Unbundling, supra note 1 at 1872, but
he quickly cautions that many copyright owner interests “simply receive no protection at all.” Id. at 1873.
70
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) (lack of commercial harm weighted
heavily in giving fair use treatment to home copyists of television programs.)
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“The Harm of the Concept of Harm”, 71 reinforces that impression. Yet Goold has in mind
something narrower, and far more justifiable: a concern with protecting those commercial
interests or activities that are by their nature incapable of being shared.
The key notion here seems to be identifying activities which require ‘exclusivity’ to be
profitable and socially useful—activities for which the usual IP assumptions of non-rivalry and
inexhaustibility fail. 72 The classic example, which Goold cites, is a copyright owner’s interest in
being the first to give a work its full publication. 73 Only one publisher can be first. 74 Similarly,
most studio executives will decline to pay for a novel’s movie rights unless the studio is assured
of being the sole producer of such a movie. Such interests in exclusivity have the commercial
resonance that can matter deeply for incentives. 75
To illustrate where his ‘control’ sub-tort would not apply, Goold points to the Supreme
Court decision in Sony v. Universal. 76 The Sony majority held that it was “fair use” for
consumers to make home copies of television programs for purposes of time-shifting. Of that
case, Goold states, “The time shifting use at issue in Sony…was not a rivalrous use, and
accordingly there was no policy rationale for protecting the owner’s interest in coordinating

71

David Ladd, The Harm of the Concept of Harm in Copyright: The Thirteenth Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture
(Apr. 13, 1983), in 30 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 421 (1983) (argues that causing “harm” should not be a precondition for copyright liability).
72
Goold, Unbundling, supra note 1 at 1871.
73
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564 (quotation from a manuscript about to be published was held not a “fair use”
when the use was sufficiently extensive to cause an authorized publisher to cancel its contract to be the first to
publish authorized excerpts). It is also from this case that Goold borrows the misleading term, “creative control.”
74
Note, however, that Goold needs to explain how quoting from unpublished works can be distinguished from the
right of first publication.
75
The Constitution gives Congress power to grant to authors and inventors exclusive rights over their works in order
to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” U.S. Constit. Art. I, 8, 8. Whether the ultimate goal of federal
copyright law is thought to be economic welfare-maximization, or production of a great quantity of authored works,
or furthering one or another alternative conception of “Progress,” it is clear that the method envisaged by the
Framers is economic incentive: harnessing demand to generate royalties and other payments so that authors can
afford to spend time creating works of expression.
76
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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time-shifting.” 77 Far from sharing the perspective of commentators such as Ladd, Goold does
not see in Sony an appropriate occasion for exerting a right of control.
Such close attention to limiting the putative control right is to the good. It is unclear,
however, what affirmative purpose would be served by recognizing such a right: copying that
violates a commercially significant ‘exclusivity’ interest is already covered by standard
copyright —because copying that wrecks a commercially-necessary exclusivity will, almost
inevitably, overlap with copying that is harmful.
Further, a sub-tort in ‘controlling rivalrous uses’ is dangerously perched on a slippery
slope. As Goold says, “Most goods ... fall somewhere on a spectrum of rivalrousness.” The
article does not specify how to determine when the non-rivalrous aspects of an unauthorized use
predominate strongly enough to warrant giving the copyright owner protection by Goold’s subtort.
Opening up a special sub-tort for ‘control’ thus presents the danger that of giving
copyright owners the ability to restrain virtually any copying that fails to fit other categories. 78
Any interest in ‘control’ thus needs sharp definition along its boundaries. Goold intimates some
potential boundaries, such as whether there exists a particular point in time when limiting
exploitation to ‘one use’ will maximize utility. 79 Whether clear lines can be articulated remains
to be seen.
Conclusion

77

Goold, Unbundling, supra note 1 at 1872.
At one point Goold seems to present his ‘control right’ as a residual category that has some exceptions; at those
points he seems to have a fairly broad notion of the sub-tort. At most other times, however, he is careful to guard
against the ‘control right’ being broadly interpreted. See Goold, Unbundling, supra note 1, at 1869-74.
79
Id.at 1870-71.
78
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The article clears some important territory. However, it is premature to make
recommendations for judicial action, as the article does.
One can understand scholars feeling pressure to find and announce solutions. Copyright’s
lack of conceptual clarity has led to some jarring results. 80 And the field is so important
economically that it seems bizarre to still be debating fundamental aspects of a key concept like
“improper appropriation”. By contrast, for example, over seventy years have passed since
negligence law received from Judge Learned Hand a clear structure for its somewhat parallel
category, “unreasonable behavior.” 81 (And maybe copyright will never catch up. About
copyright, Learned Hand himself opined on a distinction crucial to many infringement cases that
“[n] obody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can.” 82)
It is important not to overstate the dangers posed by copyright’s conceptual
ambiguities. Courts sometimes make disturbing decisions, but most infringement litigation
proceeds along unsurprising paths. As for “fair use,” it has progressed since 2004 when Larry
Lessig made his famous quip (quoted by Goold) that fair use amounts to a mere “right to hire a

80
See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, How the Jury in the ‘Blurred Lines’ Case was Misled, http://www.newsweek.com/juryblurred-lines-case-was-misled-314856 (March 17, 2015) (exploring jury finding of infringement in blurred lines case).
Goold cites to rulings in the Blurred Lines case, without discussion whether the case is atypical. Goold, Unbundling,
supra note 1, at 1836 n.4 (citing Williams v. Bridgeport Music, No. LA CV13-06004 JAK, 2015 WL 4479500, at *1–
2 (CD. Cal. July 14, 2015)) (determining, inter alia, that Defendants’ motion for a new trial should be denied)).
81
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (“[T]he owner's duty, as in other similar
situations, to provide against resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The probability that [a boat
tethered at a mooring] will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate
precautions.”). Judge Hand’s BPL test (so named for his variables: burden, probability, and loss) may not answer all
questions, but it has stayed at the center of negligence discussions for over a half-century.
82
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). The boundary in question divides ideas
(which the law makes freely copyable) from expression (over which copyright owners have some legal rights of
control). See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). Part of the purpose of determining “substantial similarity” or “improper
appropriation” is to decide if the defendant has copied only ideas (which is permitted and indeed encouraged) or if
the defendant has also copied expression.
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lawyer” 83. Some commentators argue that the fair use doctrine transitioned has “from weak reed
to powerful shield in a decade’s time.” 84
Unbundling is a notable venture for a new scholar. It shows a range of knowledge and an
independent cast of mind. Admittedly, I remain unpersuaded by its arguments for developing
copyright sub-torts to protect reputation, privacy, and a right to control rivalrous uses— but no
one article could be persuasive on three such large issues.
By disentangling various distinct interests that are often bundled together in a blurry and
confusing way in copyright cases, Goold places an important set of questions on the agenda of
copyright judges, legislators and commentators: Are these interests that copyright law does or
should serve? If so, should that change the infringement inquiry and/or the application of the fair
use doctrine? If not, how would unambiguously excluding a particular interest change current
copyright practice? Goold’s article gives urgency and clarity to this important set of inquiries.
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Goold, Unbundling, supra note 1, at 1839 (quoting Lawrence Lessig, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 187 (2004)). Goold concedes

in the footnotes that not all share this unhappy view of fair use.
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Rebecca Tushnet, Content, Purpose, or Both? 90 WASH. L. REV. 869, 872-73 (2015) (discussing doctrinal
improvements in the strength of fair use since Lessig wrote).
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